Searching for the Person to be Seized by Rotenberg, Daniel L. & Tanzer, Lois B.
SEARCHING FOR THE PERSON TO BE SEIZED
BY DANIEL L. ROTENBERG* AND Lois B. TANZBR**
I. INTRODUCTION
Nothing in the language of the fourth amendment supports a distinc-
tion between searches for property and searches for persons," yet the de-
velopment of the law has diverged in establishing requirements for these
two types of searches.2 Police authority to conduct searches for property
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) demonstrates the difference. Federal
agents staged a warrantless nighttime entry onto premises for a dual purpose-to search
for and seize a person and to search for and seize property. Despite ample opportunity
to do so, the agents had obtained neither search nor arrest warrants. After ettry was
made, however, police had witnessed the commission of a felony and thus the arrest was
valid. Rather than focusing on the basic intrusion (the entry) and the "difficult inquiry
. . . when it is that the police can enter upon a person's property to seize his person
. . . papers and effects without prior judicial approval." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 475 (1971), the Court upheld the legality of the person seizure, but took an
extremely restrictive view of the seizure of property, "the existence and precise nature and
location of which the law enforcement officers were aware long before making the lawful
arrest." Trupiano v. United States, supra at 708. The determining factors for the court
in denouncing the property seizure-advance police knowledge of the existence and location
of the evidence, police intention to seize it, and the ample opportunity for obtaining a
warrant-were equally applicable to the person seizure. Although Trupiano's extremely
restrictive view of searches "incident" to arrest has not been "reinstated" by the Court the
case retains its vitality with regard to the different standards which are applied to entries
to search for persons and entries to search for things. The distinction rests in a construction
of the fourth amendment in light of its common law background. Barrett, Perional Righit,
Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 SUPRBME COURT RBVIIW 46, 49-50,
citing, inter alia, 1 CHsTrr, CRIMINAL LAW 15-26, 33, 51-59 (1816). Search warrants
were required unless there were exceptional circumstance!:. "All felony, arrests, including
those involving entry into houses, could be made without securing warrants. In fact, warrants
were regarded with suspicion and their use recognized only reluctantly and for the primary
purpose of protecting persons making arrests from tort liability." Barrett, supra at 49.50.
Illustrative also of the dual approach to person searches and property searches is the
Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Alameida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1972),
revd, 93 S.Ct. 2535 (1973). Recognizing that the automobile search in question did
not fall within the exception to the probable cause requirement applicable to "border
searches" of persons and vehicles, the court nevertheless upheld a conviction for ttanspottfl.
tion of illegally imported marijuana discovered during an immigration search for concealed
aliens. Immigration officers had conducted the search under statutory authority, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357 (1910), had stopped the car at random, and had no grounds, reasonable or otherwise
to do so. The majority construed the statute as allowing such a search without a warrant
and without cause. The dissenting opinion of Judge Browning indicated that since this
search was not within the border search exception it violated the fourth amendment,
There is no apparent reason why these Fourth Amendment principles do not apply
with the same force to searches of automobiles for smuggled aliens as they do to
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is constrained by the general rule that searches without a search warrant
are per se unreasonable unless they fall within certain specific exceptions.3
In effect a judicial determination of both the need for the proposed sei-
zure and the probable cause to believe the object sought is within the
place to be searched is necessary prior to any invasion of an individual's
privacy. If the object of the search is a person, on the other hand, the
rule seems to be that all that is necessary is an arrest warrant4 and, in-
deed, in some jurisdictions, given grounds for an arrest without a warrant,
even that will not be required. 5 The crucial distinction is that the arrest
warrant, unlike the search warrant, does not require any prior judicial
finding of the need for the police to search or of the probability that
the search will be fruitful. This distinction between searches for persons
and searches for property is embodied in federal and state procedural
rules on warrants and searches. Generally, arrest warrants require desig-
nation or description of the person to be arrested with no reference to
the places that may be searched in effecting the arrest.6 Search warrants,
searches of automobiles for smuggled merchandise. Yet this court has drawn a
sharp distinction between the two.... If a reason exists for distinguishing searches
for aliens from searches for merchandise, no one-including this court-has yet
suggested what it might be.
United States v. Alameida-Sanchez, supra at 463-64.
3Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The exceptions include: a) search
incident to and following a lawful arrest, Chimel v. Calif., 395 U.S. 752 (1969); b) search
of vehicles with probable cau'e, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); c) consent
searches, Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543 (1968); d) search with probable cause for and in hot pursuit of fleeing and
dangerous felony suspect, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); e) search of abandoned
real estate or personal property, Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); f) search under
urgent necessity, United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied 377
U.S. 1004 (1964); g) search pursuant to custodial prerogative, Cooper v. Calif., 386 U.S. 58(1967); h) search with probable cause, necessary to prevent loss or destruction of the thing to
be seized, United States v. Barone, supra, Johnson v. United States, supra.
4 "While there is no strict logic in the matter it seems to be accepted, at least by
implication, that the ob:aining of an arrest warrant is material in supporting a search of
premises as not 'unreasonab!e' even though the magistrate has not passed upon the need
for invasion of privacy of the premises." Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 396
n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Wright J., dissenting).
5 See the discussion and the citation of early cases in Wilgus, Arrest ll'itbout a Warrant,
22 Mc L. R v. 541, 558, 798, 800-03 (1924). See also Annot., 5 A.LR. 263 (1920);
Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 1432 (1961). Tort law is consistent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTs §§ 204 and 206 (1965).
6 ED. R. CuM.N P. 4(b)(1) provides that the warrant "shall contain the name of the de-
fendant or, if his name is unknown, any name or description by which he can be identified
with reasonable certainty. It shall describe the offense charged in the complaint.
Nothing in Rule 4 refers to place.
Statutory law supports the position of the procedural rules. For example, federal law
on searches without a search warrant states that
whoever, being an officer, agent or employee of the United States or any depart-
ment or agency thereof, engaged in the enforcement of any law of the United
States searches any private dwelling used and occupied as such dwelling without a
warrant directing such search... shall be fined.., or imprisoned .... This sec-
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on the other hand, require a specific description of the place to be
searched as well as the property sought with no reference to persons
sought.7 This means that if the object of the search is a person, neither
arrest nor search warrant rules fit. There is thus no established procedure
that complies with the constitutional mandate that "no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons.., to be seized." 8
Most states make no provision for obtaining a warrant to search for
persons;9 and although the drafters of the recent ALl draft on search
and seizure included persons among the objects of a search when warrants
are sought,10 they did so without conviction. Since neither the search
and seizure nor the arrest draft provisions require a search warrant for
a person, the drafters view the inclusion as unnecessary but harmless."
tion shall not apply to any person a) serving a warrant of arrest, or b) arresting or
attempting to arrest a person...,
18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1970), thereby affording a grant of authority to seek out the person to
be arrested without a search warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1970) provides, "The officer may break open any outer or Inner
door or window, of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a
search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance. ... "
This same standard applies to entries for execution of arrest warrants, Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958), and execution of warrantless arrests. Sabbath v. United States,
391 U.S. 585 (1968). The distinction remains, however, that with a search warrant, the
need for entry and search has been passed upon by a neutral magistrate, whereas under arrest
authority the need to enter and search is determined by the officer.
7 FED. R. CaIM. P. 41(b) and (c) provide: "A warrant may be issued under this rule
to search for and seize any property. . . . [The judge or commissioner] shall issue a warrant
identifying the property and naming or describing the persoa or place to be searched. . ....
Although Rule 41 covers the search of a person, it does not cover the place to be searched
for a person; the Rule also does not provide for either identifying or seizing a person.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
9 Delaware and Vermont are exceptions. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2305 (Supp. 1970).
"Objects of search warrant. A warrant may authorize the search of any house or place for
(6) Persons for whom a warrant of arrest has been issued." § 2307 (Supp. 1970);
"Issuance of Search IWarrant; contents. The warrant shall designate the house, place, convey-
ance or person to be searched, and shall describe the things or persons sought as particularly
as possible .... " VT. STAT. ANN, tit. 13, § 4701 (Supp. 1970): "Issuance of search war-
rants. (2) To search for and seize a person against whom a warrant for a criminal offense
has been issued when such person is believed to be secreted .... " § 4702 (Supp. 1970):
"Affidavit. A search warrant shall not be granted except lwhen an affiant] has reason to
suspect and does suspect that a person against whom a warrant for a criminal offense has been
issued is secreted in the house or place to be searched .... "
10 ALI, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 220.1(3) (Proposed
Official Draft No. 1, 1972):
Contents of Application. The application shall describe with particularity the indi-
viduals or places to be searched and the individuals or things to be seized, and shall
be supported by one or more affidavits particularly setting forth the facts and cir-
cumstances tending to show that such individuals or things are in the places ... to
be searched.
11 In the commentary to the ALI, A MODEL CODE OF ]RE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE,
the view that a search warrant is required for almost any kind of entry into premises includ.ing entry to arrest, is rejected as "lack[ing] substantial support in the accepted law relating
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Moreover, although the Supreme Court has spoken often concerning
searches for articles, 12 there has been a lack of critical discussion by the
Court, as well as by other courts and scholars, dealing with the scope
of police authority to conduct a" search for persons as a prerequisite to
lawful arrest.1 3  So silent have been the law and the commentators that
some observers of police practices may not even be aware of the prob-
lem.14
This article explores the differences between fourth amendment stric-
tures and current operational requirements for person searches, focusing
on police authority to make, with or without an arrest warrant, entries
and subsequent searches to effect an otherwise valid arrest. The article
also examines the existing dichotomy between searches for property and
persons and scrutinizes the rationale offered in support of the distinction.
It is concluded that there is no satisfactory justification for the difference
and that, therefore, the fourth amendment requires that the legal stan-
dards and procedural practice developed for searches for objects be ap-
plied to searches for persons.
As previously indicated, the relevant cases are few and their discus-
sions often ignore or focus only tangentially on the issue under consid-
to arrest, and is unsufficiently supported by considerations of policy. However, there does
not appear to be any objection to granting explicit statutory authority for such searches
... " Id. at 170. Thus, a search warrant may be used where the object sought is a person
subject to arrest or "unlawfully held in confinement or other restraint." § 210.3(1)(d).
Section 120.6, Place of Arrest: Private Premises, makes no provision for designation in
an arrest warrant of the place to be entered although a restriction is included on time
of arrest. § 120.6(3). Police authority to make entry onto private premises under authority
of arrest is clearly spelled out in §§ 120.6(1) and (2). The requirements are that the
officer have reasonable cause to believe that a person whom he is authorized to arrest is
present on any private premises. Entry may be made upon demand after the officer has
identified himself or without demand, under exigent circumstances.
12 See the discussion and the cases cited in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
449-84 (1971).
1 3 The statement in Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
that "there is little if any analysis focusing on entry into a dwelling for the purpose of
an arrest" is equally applicable to analysis focusing on subsequent searches of dwellings
for persons to be arrested. Critical analysis most likely has been foreclosed by general
acceptance of the rule that a police officer may make a peaceable or forcible entry to search
any premites without a search warrant for the purpose of arresting one accused of a felony.
5 Am. JuR. 2d Arrest §§ 89-93 (1962).- In addition, there has been an analytic failure
to distinguish between the entry stage and the search stage of the arrest procedure. See
discussion accompanying notes 66-68, infra.
See LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures into the
"Quagmire"' 8 CRim. L BULL. 9, 14,20 (1972).
14 In the second edition of HALL AND KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMNAL PROCEDUREI (2d
ed. 1966), there was no express category or subsection directed to the subject of person
searches. Some case fact situations, however, presented the issue although the court opinions
did not analyze it. See, e.g., State v. Chinn, 231 Or. 259, 373 P.2d 392 (1962), cited in
HALL AND KAMISAR, supra at 113. The third edition gives full recognition to the problem.
HALL, KAMISAR, LAFAvE, AND ISRAEL, MODERN CR ,INAL PROCEDURE 267-68 (3d ed.
1969) and SUPPLEAENT 71-73 (1973).
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eration. Nevertheless, succeeding sections analyze several of these cases
because they (1) reveal the factual variations of person searches; (2) sug-
gest the blunt outlines of traditional law; (3) identify the kinds of propo-
sals being considered for clarifying or changing the law; and (4) indicate
the degree of judicial receptivity to the notion that something needs to
be done.
II. SEARCHES WITHOUT AN ARRisT WARRANT
Federal law enforcement officers may make warrantless arrests upon
probable cause." Indeed Congress has explicitly authorized United States
marshalls,'0 secret service, 17 narcotics and dangerous drug officers, 18 and
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)"0 to make warrant-
less arrests even when there is time to get a warrant without fear that the
suspect may flee. The issue under consideration in this paper, however,
is not the question of authority to make warrantless arrests but rather
authority to make entries and subsequent searches to effect an arrest ab.
sent a search warrant. Unfortunately most of the cases involving war-
rantless arrests do not confront this issue directly. Rather the question
of the legality of a warrantless police intrusion is more often presented
in the context of motions to suppress physical evidence seized during
such intrusions. Nevertheless, examination of the case law in point does
provide a starting point for analysis.
In assessing the legality of a warrantless police entry and search under
arrest authority the Supreme Court has focused primarily on the real pur-
pose of the search. Thus, in Jones v. United States,20 the Court rejected
a government argument that federal agents without a search or an arrest
warrant entered a dwelling for the purpose of arrest. The Court, instead,
found that the search by officers whose daytime search warrant had ex-
pired was based on their probable cause to believe that the dwelling
contained contraband. Since the Court found that the officers' real pur-
pose was to search for distillery equipment and not to arrest Jones, the
warrantless search was untenable. However, the Court did not reach
5The constitutional standard for making a warrantless arrest is reflected in federal stat-
utes which require that officers have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed or is committing a felony. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,
100 (1959).
10 18 U.S.C. § 3053 (1970).
17 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (1970).
1821 U.S.C. § 878 (1970).
19 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1970). Customs officers, INT. REV. CODn OF 1954, § 7607,
and postal personnel, 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (1970) have similar authority.
20 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
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the question whether even an arrest warrant would have been mandatory
under similar circumstances where the object of the search was an arrest.
Thus Jones left unresolved a "grave constitutional question, namely
whether the forceful nighttime entry into a dwelling to arrest a person
reasonably believed within upon probable cause that he committed a fel-
ony, under circumstances where-no reason appears why an arrest warrant
could not have been sought, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment." 2'
Other courts have approached the problem similarly.- 2 The purpose
of the search in United States v. Verdugo2 was a pivotal factor in the
successful challenge made to a detailed search of a private residence
conducted subsequent to an arrest. In Verdugo, the agents of the Bureau
of Narcotics and a San Francisco police inspector arrived at defendant's
residence, ostensibly seeking Verdugo. The defendant's wife stated that
her husband was not at home, whereupon the officers gained entrance
after a "show of authority, ' 2 4 walked around, looked into rooms to deter-
mine if Verdugo was present, and stationed themselves in the home to
await his return. When Verdugo returned, he ordered the officers out
of his home but was immediately placed under arrest and restrained. The
officers then undertook a second, more extensive and detailed search of
the premises. Although the government contended that the agents went
211d. at 499-500. The issue was once again acknowledged by five members of the Court
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,477-78 (1971):
It is clear, then, that the notion that the warrantless entry of a man's house in
order to arrest him on probable cause is per se legitimate is in fundamental con-
flict with the basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures
inside a man's house without warrant are per se unreasonable in the absence of
some one of a number of well defined "exigent circumstances."
Justice White added,
[A]rrest and search of the person on probable cause but without a warrant is
the prevailing constitutional and legislative rule, without regard to whether on the
particular facts there was opportunity to secure a warrant. Apparently, exigent cir-
cumstances are so often present in arrest situations that it has been deemed im-
provident to litigate the issue in every case.
Id. at 523-24.
In Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), appellant had urged that his nighttime
arrest in his home without a warrant was unlawful in the absence of a valid excuse for
failing to obtain a warrant. Again, the question was not reached by the Court since the
conviction did not rest on evidence found in Johnson's home.2 2 In the recent case of United States v. Artieri, 14 CRaM. L. REP. 2410 (2d Cir. Jan.
23, 1974), the district court suppressed evidence because it found that a warrantless entry
was for the purpose of searching for drugs. The Second Circuit reversed finding that the pur-
pose of entry was arrest.
23 240 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. CaL 1965).
2 4 Id. at 499. Although a commissioner's arrest warrant for Verdugo had been issued in
September, 1964 for a July, 1964 narcotics law violation, the court stated that it was con-
ceded that the government agents and police officers were not armed with an arrest warrant
during the search and arrest which took place in October, 1964. Id. at 498. The court
seems to view the case as if it were a non-arrest warrant one; thus, we view it that way.
1974]
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to defendant's residence for the purpose of arrest, the court stated "the
plain import of the testimony was that they were to look for the contra-
band and to make an arrest in order to get same.' "2  Because the purpose
of the search was to find property, the court held the search to be unrea-
sonable. The Verdugo court, like the Jones court, did not directly con-
sider the question of the validity of the entry and initial search apparently
made pursuant to achieving the arrest.
Since neither Jones nor Verdugo confront the precise question of the
validity of a warrantless entry and search based upon a reasonable belief
that an individual whom the police have probable cause to believe has
committed a felony is inside, only tentative conclusions can be drawn
from the opinions. Two factors, however, support the conclusion that
a bona fide purpose of arrest would have sterilized, at least in part, these
police searches. First, the fact that both courts narrowed the focus of
their inquiry to the purpose of the search implies that there are different
standards required of searches for objects than are necessary for valid
searches foi persons. Second, the Supreme Court in Jones framed "the
grave constitutional question" in terms of an intrusion made under cir-
cumstances where an arrest warrant could have been sought. In other
words, the Court, at least in dicta, seems to assume that a search warrant
is unnecessary when the object of a search is a person.
In fact, the Tenth Circuit, in Michael v. United States,0 upheld a
warrantless, unconsented 5:30 A.M. intrusion and search of a private resi-
dence by three FBI agents, two sheriffs, and two deputies in which a
bona fide purpose of arrest was established. The court found that the
federal agent who six months earlier had been officially notified and au-
thorized to locate and apprehend the deserter, and who had been in-
formed shortly before the date of the search that the deserter was in
the Michael home, had authority to arrest Michael either with or without
a warrant of arrest. Moreover, the court, relying by negative implication
on Federal Rule 41, indicated that a purpose to arrest is clearly sufficient
to justify an entry into a private residence when there is good reason
to believe the individual sought would be found:
This court, therefore, considers that, quite irrespective of the ultimate
determination of James Warren Michael's guilt of desertion or Joyce
Marie Michael's guilt of harboring her husband, as a deserter, the arrest
of each of them, and the entry by the arresting officers into their place
of abode, was lawful. That is true despite the absence of a warrant of
arrest in respect of either of them. And, so far as concerns the absence
of a search warrant, the appellee correctly contends that there was, in the
25 Id. ai 498.
26 393 F.2d 22 (loth Cir. 1968).
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circumstances of the event, no occasion for the procurement or posses-
sion by Agent Radford of a warrant of that character. He came to ar-
rest a man-and, contingently, also a woman, and possibly another man
-not to locate, identify or seize any property.27
It is interesting to note that the appellant in this case was Mrs. Mi-
chael who had been convicted of willfully harboring her deserter-
husband, Had the focus of the search of her home been property rather
than a person, objections to the reasonableness of the warrantless, uncon-
sented intrusion would doubtless have elicited a different judicial re-
sponse.28
In contrast with the above opinions, which apparently assume that
no warrant of any kind is necessary for an entry and search for an indi-
vidual who is to be arrested, are cases reflecting a somewhat greater con-
cern for traditional fourth amendment standards. In M1forrison v. United
States, 9 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
a warrantless police entry, made two hours after an alleged perverted
act, and a subsequent search of a private dwelling in an effort to arrest
the suspect, to be illegal in the absence of any urgency, even though
the police had probable cause to believe a felony had been committed.
Although Morrison has been cited to support the argument that a search
warrant is required to search a premises for a suspect,30 a careful reading
of the case does not support this conclusion. In the first place the legal-
ity of the search was tested by a motion to suppress physical evidence,
suggesting that the court's consideration of the legality of the search per
se was directed toward the search for the property and not the search
2 7 1 d. at 33.
2 8 In these circumstances the potential protections afforded by the Vermont and Dela-
ware statutes and the Proposed ALI Rules which include persons within the scope of search
warrants are greater than the ALI Commentary suggests. See notes 9-11, supra, and accom-
panying text. Inclusion of persons to be arrested within the scope of search warrants is,
however, meaningless unless judicially recognized and supported as constitutionally required.
29262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cit. 1958). See also Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456
(D.C. Cir. 1949).
2 0 See Wheeler v. Goodman, 330 F. Supp. 1356, 1362 (W.D. N.C. 1971); Lankford
v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 206 (4th Cit. 1966) (appellant's argument). Other cases relied
upon for the proposition that a search warrant is required when searching premises for
a person are District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949) and Accarino
v. United States, 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
Morrison, Accarino, and Little are opinions by Judge Prettyman. The dicta of these
cases unquestionably are forceful support for requiring a search warrant when entry to prem-
ises is made: "We emphasize that no matter who the officer is or what his mission, a
government official cannot invade a private home, unless (1) a magistrate has authorized
him to do so or (2) an immediate major crisis in the performance of duty affords neither
time nor opportunity to apply to a magistrate." Accarino, supra at 464; and Little, supra
at 17.
However, Accarino and Morrison were arrest cases in which the police had neither arrest
nor search warrants; Little was a health code inspection case.
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for the suspect. Furthermore, the fact that police had neither an arrest
nor a search warrant and the court's statement that "police officers can-
not, without a warrant of any kind, walk into an unoccupied, unlocked
private home and search it, either for property or a person," 1 imply,
it would seem, that an arrest warrant alone would have validated the
entry and subsequent search in the absence of urgency or necessitous
haste.
In Warden v. Hayden, 2 the Supreme Court, again considering the
admissibility of physical evidence, upheld both the entry and the subse-
quent search for a robber without a warrant because "the exigencies of
the situation made that course imperative."8  The Court found that the
police, informed that the suspect of an armed robbery had entered a dwel-
ling minutes before their arrival, had acted properly when they entered
and began to search for the suspect. But, if it is exigent circumstances
such as "hot pursuit" which support the search warrant exception in this
situation, then can it be inferred that the search of a premises for a per-
son to be arrested in the absence of exigent circumstances requires a
search warrant? In light of the fact that the police in Warden v. iHayden
did not have an arrest warrant, it is a more likely inference-if any infer-
ence at all can be drawn"-that what is required, and what is consistent
with Morrison, is not a search warrant but an arrest warrant.8 5
Finally, in Dorman v. United States,0 police, with positive identifica-
tion of a robbery suspect, with evidence of his address, and with knowl-
edge that he was armed, made a warrantless, unconsented, non-forcible
late evening entry into his apartment a few hours after the offense. The
court, echoing Jones v. United States,37 acknowledged the "grave consti-
tutional issue" raised by an unconsented nighttime entry into a private
residence to arrest a suspected felon when no reason appears why an
31262 F.2d 449,453 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
32387 U.S. 294 (1967).
33Id. at 298, quoting from McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
See also White v. Brough, 332 F. Supp. 438 (D. Md. 1971).
4 Because of the presence of exigent circumstances, the Court may have simply not
considered alternative bases for validating the entry. Thus no implication was intended
and no inference should be drawn. Justice White commenting on the majority's suggestion
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) "that warrantless, probable-cause arrests
may not be made in the home absent exigent circumstance.," Id. at 512 n.1, pointed out
that the Court had never intimated or held as a constitutional matter a requirement of exi.
gent circumstances "other than the necessity for arresting a felon .... " Id.
35Justice Stewart in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) observed, "The
case of Warden v. Hayden ... certainly stands by negative implication for the proposi-
tion that an arrest warrant is required in the absence of exigent circumstances." i, at
480-81.
30435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
37 357 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1958).
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arrest warrant could not have been procured. But the court held the
entry and search for Dorman was not violative of his constitutional
rights, since the case "presented the kind of exigent circumstances and
urgent need that justified an entry . . .without the delay incident to
the warrant." '  Dorman was decided by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, the same court that had earlier decided Alor-
rison. In dicta, the Dorman court cited the Morrison opinion approving-
ly and went to some length to equate the standards for search for persons
and property. Nevertheless, the result reached by the court, the refer-
ences to Morrison, and the court's continued references to the need for
"a warrant" all would seem to indicate that Dorman ultimately does not
change the need for police to secure search warrants when the object
of the search is a person.
The thrust of these latter cases does appear, however, to limit the
broad grant of authority to enter and search a premises as prerequisite
to arrest when neither an arrest nor a search warrant has been obtained,
to situations which fall within the recognized warrant exception of urgent
need or exigent circumstances.
Ill. SEARCHES WITH AN ARREST WARRANT
As the discussion above implies, police authority under an arrest war-
rant to search private property for a person is firmly established in the
case law;3 9 however, the extent of that authority may depend upon
whether the search involves the suspect's premises or a third party's prem-
ises. The validity of a search for a person on that person's own property
under authority of an arrest warrant appears unquestioned. As early as
1931 the Fourth Circuit, in Paper v. United States,4" assumed that a bench
warrant was the fourth amendment equivalent of a search warrant. In
that case officers in searching for a person on his premises in order to
arrest him discovered physical evidence of a crime other than that for
3 8 Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The Dormegn court
identified relevant considerations in applying the exigent circumstances test:
1) a grave offense is involved, particularly a crime of violence; 2) the suspect is
reasonably believed to be armed; 3) a "dear showing" is made of probable cause
to believe that the suspect committed the crime involved; 4) strong reason exists to
believe that the suspect is on the premises; 5) there is likelihood that the suspect
will escape if not quickly apprehended; 6) the entry is peaceable; 7) and a factor
which cuts two ways: the entry is made at night.
Id. at 392-93. See also Vance v. North Carolina, 432 F.2d 984, 990 (4th Cir. 1970) and
United States v. Shye, 13 C/IM. L REP. 2428 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 9, 1973) which review
and apply the Dorman standards of exigency; and United States v. Honesty, 459 F.2d 1279
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
39 See authorities cited note 5, supra.
40 53 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1931).
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which they were seeking arrest. The court noted that searches which
violated the Constitution involved either an element of trespass or a
fraudulent invasion. There was clearly no fraud on the facts of the case,
since the officers did have a bona fide arrest purpose. Moreover the court
found, without discussion, that the evidence had been seized not by tres-
pass but during a lawful search, since the "officers had the right to go
upon the defendant's premises for the purpose of finding and arresting
him." 41
The Third Circuit in United States v. Joine, a2 affirmed the proposi-
tion that, by virtue of the warrant of arrest, officers have a lawful right
to search the premises of the suspect, and to break open outer or inner
doors if necessary. Defendant had sought to suppress evidence which
had been discovered by Internal Revenue Service agents in the course
of searching an empty home for him in order to execute an arrest war-
rant. The agents had broken an outside cellar door and had come upon
and seized a still, mash and liquor. The court, in a per curiam opinion,
found that the evidence had been discovered and seized in the course of a
lawful search for the defendant.
One review,43 the Supreme Court vacated judgment and remanded
the case for consideration in light of Jones v. United States,44 decided
that same day. The conviction was reaffirmed on remand 5 and the legal-
ity of the search and seizure was upheld since "officers [armed with a
warrant of arrest] searched the defendant's dwelling house in a bona
fide attempt to find and arrest him and . . . they did not know of, or
even suspect, the existence of the still, mash and liquor in the dwelling
house until they came upon it in the course of their search for the defen-
dant.' 46 The court distinguished Jones on the grounds that the officers
in Joines not only had an arrest warrant but also had no probable cause
to believe the articles subject to seizure were hi the dwelling.
The breadth of police authority under an arrest warrant is further
exemplified by the Fourth Circuit opinion in the case of United States
v. Retolaza.47  In that case agents in possession of a warrant for defen-
dant's arrest were admitted to his apartment by his wife to verify their
knowledge that defendant was not present. According to the court, "The
only search made by the agents was for the person of the defendant.
41 Id. at 185.
42 246 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1957).
43 357 U.S. 573 (1958).
44 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
45258 F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958).
46 Id. at 472.
47 398 F.2d 235 (th Cir. 1968).
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It was conducted under the authority of the arrest warrant. .. ."4 In
upholding the entry to the premises and the legality of evidence seized
by the offices, the court stated:
We have no quarrel with the proposition that .. police may not take
advantage of entry to a house under warrant of arrest.., to conduct a
search of the type which the Fourth Amendment requires be conducted
under search warrant, issued upon a showing of probable cause. This
case is simply not one of that dass. The agents of the FBI who had a
warrant for defendant's arrest, were fully justified in requesting Mrs.
Retolaza [who had accompanied them to the premises] to give them en-
trance to her apartment to verify the non-presence of the defendant, not-
withstanding that their own investigation from the outside indicated that
there was no one within.49
Thus these cases not only allow the police to enter and search the res-
idence of the person named in an arrest warrant; they allow the intrusion
when the police officers do not have probable cause to believe the suspect
is at home at the time, and, as Retolaza suggests, even when the police
have reason to think that the suspect is not at home.
'When compared with seaiches of the suspect's own premises the pre-
vailing requirement for suspect searches of a third party's premises under
authority of an arrest warrant is more stringent since it appears that po-
lice must have probable cause to believe the suspect is in fact on the
premises.5" The distinctiveness of searches for persons on the premises
of third parties was brought sharply into focus in Lankford v. Gelston,5'
a case in which police officers, with arrest warrants for two persons sus-
pected of committing armed robbery and wounding a police lieutenant,
conducted over 300 searches during a nineteen day period, most of which
were searches of private residences. In an action seeking injunctive relief
to prevent the city police commissioner and police officers from contin-
uing or resuming such searches,5 - the Fourth Circuit issued a decree which
enjoined the police from conducting a search of private residences,
whether with or without an arrest warrant, for the purpose of arresting
any person not known to reside there, in the absence of probable cause
48 Id. at 238.
49Id.
50 See note 5, supra; see also United States v. Brown, 467 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
But see, Love v. United States, 170 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 912
(1949); United States v. Alexander, 346 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
993 (1966).
51364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
52-Not only the intensity but the character of the search was in question; as the court
said, "The undisputed testimony indicates that the police in conducting the wholesale ...
raids were engaging in a practice which on a smaller scale has routinely attended efforts
to apprehend persons accused of serious crime." Id. at 201.
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to believe the person was on the premises. The court, however, refused
to grant the broader injunction which had been sought prohibiting such
searches in the absence of exigent circumstances unless police had ob-
tained a search warrant and, hence, prior judicial determination of prob-
able cause to search for the person on the premises of a stranger, saying,
"We have no occasion now to accept or reject the legal theory thus ad-
vanced ... or to canvass countervailing arguments."58
The same legal theory-that in the absence of exceptional circum-
stances, and even with probable cause to believe the suspect is within,
a search warrant is required before entering and searching a third party's
premises to execute a valid arrest warrant-was explicitly raised in
United States v. McKinney and rejected. The court concurred with ap-
pellant's statement that the fourth amendment applies "whether the gov-
ernment is searching for objects or for a person for whom an arrest war-
rant has been issued,"6' 5 but added that "even if we were to accept
appellant's premise that a search warrant must be obtained in the absence
of exceptional circumstances, there is good reason to hold that the issu-
ance of an arrest warrant is itself an exceptional circumstance obviating
the need for a search warrant." 6 McKinney stands for the proposition
that a magistrate's determination of probable cause to arrest and the in-
herent mobility of the person combine to justify a. search without a search
warrant of a third party's premises if authorities reasonably believe the
suspect can be found within.
A different view, however, was espoused in IWheeler v, Goodman:67
"Two factors often advanced to justify a search without a search warrant
are 1) the existence of an arrest warrant, and 2) tips from 'reliable infor-
mants.' It does not appear that . . . either of these factors justifies a
search without a search warrant unless the search comes within one of
the otherwise recognized exceptions." ' In IJlheeler, findings were made
in six cases for the purpose of granting or denying injunctive relief
against police conduct. The findings in one of them, Harris v. Good-
man,5 9 are instructive. The search in Harris was made of the home of
the suspect's cousin, Walter Booker, by police with an arrest warrant
for Larry Miller, a robbery and murder suspect. The search in question
was based on reliable and confidential information given to police
53M, at 206.
54379 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1967).
55 Id, at 263.
56 ld.
5 330 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. N.C. 1971).
58 Id, at 1362.
59 Id, at 1368-69.
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through FBI agents that the suspect was in the apartment, that he was
armed, and that he had said he would never be captured alive. During
the search a search warrant was requested by Mrs.'Booker but none was
displayed. Miller was not found in the apartment. The court found
that the "legality of the daytime search of the Booker home is a close
question, but the court is of the opinion that there was probable cause
to make the search and that the search did satisfy the Warden v. Hayden
. ..exception to the warrant requirement, as that exception is defined
in Dorman v. United States" . . . and that the search was therefore
not unreasonable."' '
Thus the Wheeler court, in assessing the reasonableness of searches
for persons conducted with arrest warrants but without search warrants,
seems to indicate that something more than probable cause to believe
the suspect is on the premises is required, and that what is required is
adherence to the basic rule that searches conducted without prior judicial
approval are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment-subject
only to a few exceptions, such as a search conducted by police while
they are in hot pursuit of a fleeing and dangerous felony suspect.
With the exception of a rare opinion like Wheeler, "02 the cases attrib-
ute much too comprehensive a grant of authority to an arrest warrant.
The language of the fourth amendment contemplates a prior judicial de-
termination of the probable cause for the seizure of persons and the prob-
able cause that such persons are in fact located in the premises to be
searched. When the suspect's premises are to be searched, the warrant,
as we have seen, validates the search although neither judge nor police
officer has weighed the evidence supporting probable cause to believe
the suspect is on his premises. There is no reason to conclude that he
invariably will be there-that any inquiry is superfluous. In some in-
stances, for example when the suspect is aware that he is wanted by
the police, the last place he might be found is at his home; in other
instances, he may reside at home but it may be unknown during what
60 See note 37, supra.
6 1 Harris v. Goodman, 330 F. Supp. 1356, 1369 (W.D. N.C. 1971).
62 Another court has found that "to grant officers the right to search a private residence
without a warrant under the guise of searching for one 'AWOL' from the armed forces
would open the avenue to subterfuge, deception, and artifice." England v. State, 488 P.
2d 1347, 1349 (Old. Cr. 1971). In this case six officers, searching for a person for whom
a U.S. Marine Corps arrest warrant had been issued arrived at a third party's residence.
The officers had gone to the same address the week before. While proceeding to the back
door two officers detected the odor of marijuana; they then looked in the windows and
saw the defendant smoking a rolled cigarette. They entered the premises and arrested the
defendant. On appeal the court reversed defendant's conviction upon a finding that the
officers were trespassers ab initio since they should have obtained a search warrant if they
were going to a residence to search for the suspect.
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hours or on what days he is present. In still other instances, as, for
example, when the suspect has been under continual investigation and
surveillance, the very foreseeability of his presence supports the practical.
ity of obtaining a warrant to search for him. :It is significant that the
suspect's interest in his residence may not be exclusive; third parties-
relatives or friends-may have a privacy interest in the premises. For
these reasons a judicial determination of probable cause should precede
any search for a suspect-even on his own property.
The law concerning searches on a third party's premises is an im.
provement in that it requires, in addition to an arrest warrant, a probable
cause decision as to the suspect's whereabouts. Unfortunately, it calls
for a police determination only-a determination which may frequently
be inadequate. For obvious reasons an enforcement oriented agency will
have difficulty in objectively determining probable cause. Whether the
search be of the suspect's premises or the premises of a third party the
determination of probable cause must be made by a decision-maker who
is "neutral and detached" 3 and "judicial."' a4  The precedent is clear. If
the search warrant procedure is meaningful for property searches, then
it is meaningful also for person searches."'
Another problem with many of the cases dealing with person searches
is the blurring of the entry issue and the subsequent search issue." The
63 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971).
o4 Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) discusses the requirement of a "judicial"
officer and cites earlier cases. Id. at 348-50. The effect of the decision, however, is to
dilute the judicial quality because it allows municipal clerks to determine probable cause
and issue arrest warrants. The authorization by the Court appears to be narrow as the
clerk's authority extends only to breaches of municipal ordinances.
65The classic statement of this policy was made in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 13-14 (1948):
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous ofli'
cers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of be-
ing judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disin.
terested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making
a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the
people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers. Crime, even in the
privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to society, and the law
allows such crime to be reached on proper showing. The right of officers to
thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual
but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from
surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of
search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or gov-
ernment enforcement agent.
G0 In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967), the Court did consider the search
separate from the entry, observing, "We agree . . . that neither the entry without warrant
to search for the robber, nor the search for him ...was invalid." The Court also added,
"The permissible scope of the search must, therefore, at the least, be as broad as may
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commingling of the two problems produces the reasoning in Dorman
that "if the entry to make an arrest was lawful, the police acted reason-
ably in looking behind sofas and in closets to locate the suspect"' and
in Morrison that "the entry is lawful or unlawful at the time it is made,
and a subsequent search has the same legal character as the entry which
made it possible." '
When an intrusion is based upon exigent circumstances the entry
and scope of the search are usually supportable by the same considera-
tions of exigency; this may account for the issue blurring. When, how-
ever, an entry is justified because of the arguably greater police authority
under an arrest warrant, it does not necessarily follow that a broad search
of, for example, closets or cabinets is also justified. Although the lawful-
ness of an entry to arrest may validate subsequent search activity, it may
just as well not; what is required is an independent appraisal of the scope
of a post-entry search.
IV. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
In the absence of a search warrant, a search for a person when con-
ducted under exigent circumstances is consistent with the fourth amend-
ment standards of reasonableness. It has been suggested that in addition
to the usual exceptions, the grounds which support an arrest are in them-
selves exigent circumstances,"' and that the inherent mobility of the per-
son creates an exceptional circumstance.70  These suggestions require
comment.
The argument that the facts which call for an arrest of a suspect
make reasonable a warrantless search of a premises for him is based on
the premise that inherent in the concept of arrest is a need for immedi-
acy: that an arrest should occur immediately after the crime or immedi-
ately after sufficient evidence is obtained which would support an arrest.
reasonably be necessary to prevent the dangers that the suspect at large in the house may
resist or escape." Id. at 299. Justice Stewart has characterized "the question of the scope of
the search and seizure once the police are on the premises [as] subsidiary to the basic issue of
when intrusion is permissible," and has said "that the difficult inquiry would be when it is
that the police can enter upon a person's property to seize his 'person... papers, and effects,'
without prior judicial approval." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 475 (1971).
67 435 F.2d 385, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
68 262 F.2d 449, 453 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
69 United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259,263 (6th Cir. 1967).
7O Id. See also United States v. Hall, 348 F.2d 837, 841 (2d Cir. 1965), in which Judge
Friendly stated,
One reason underlying the distinction [between the warrant requirement in the
law of search and seizure and its absence in the law of arrest] may be that a per-
son, save possibly when asleep at home during the night, always has the same po-
tential mobility as do objects which are in a moving vehicle . . . and are thus
subject to search and seizure on probable cause without a search warrant.
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To what extent immediacy is important to successful arrests is simply
unknown. 1 The issue is complex. Immediacy in investigating a crime
must be distinguished from immediacy in arresting a criminal. In many
instances it is important to get a suspect's description or identity and
thus to get to the crime scene and witnesses quickly; 2 but there may
be no hurry in getting to the suspect. In other situations there is no
need even for prompt investigations. In many atssaults, for example, the
victim knows well the offender. Further, if the investigating techniques
of a police department anticipate the use of detectives to follow up re-
ports of certain crimes, then in those instances, police policy has assigned
thoroughness a higher priority than speed. 3
The nature of the criminal and the crime are also relevant. An of-
fender who is dangerously irrational or one who plans to flee the jurisdic-
tion must be captured immediately; but many criminals, even killers, are
not necessarily still dangerous;74 and many people are aware that flight
is apt to attract suspicion to them, even if they do not know that it
may be admissible evidence of guilt. There are many crimes which do
not inherently call for quick arrest. Examples include white collar
crimes, such as embezzlement, fraud, and bribery; highly organized crimi-
nal activity, for example, conspiracies involving a complex personnel ar-
rangement and complex goals; and "victimless" crimes such as gambling,
prostitution, and drug misuse. On the contrary, often the "delayed ar-
rest" 75 is. used-sometimes to further police ends of, for instance, arrest.
ing "many later instead of one now, ''7 and sometimes to achieve purposes
beyond arrest, such as the acquisition of evidence sufficient to convict. 7
What this analysis suggests is that the risks are neither so great nor so
obvious as to elevate arrest qua arrest to the level of an exigency. From
a practical standpoint it should be incumbent upon the police to obtain
a search warrant or combination type warrant with nearly the same regu-
71 This is not surprising. Empirical evidence on police practices is still more assumption
than fact in many respects. The real facts are needed, however, if the law is to continue
to build itself on a factual foundation. Hopefully, the empirical research on police practices
that has taken place recently will be read as an encouragement for more and not as an
indication that the field has been drained of value.
72 See, e.g., PRES. COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICB,
TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 96-97 (1967).
73Frequently arrests on private premises are made by detectives during the investigative
period. See LaFave, Warrantiess Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Venturoi Into
the "Quagmire," 8 CGlm. LAW BULL. 9, 22 (1972).
74 It is common knowledge that the recidivism rate for murderers is very low.
75 See W. R. LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY
208-24 (1965).
701d. at 222-24.




larity with which they procure an arrest warrant. Frequently the search
of a private premises will be inherent in the situation and may be, in
fact, a foreseeable prerequisite to an arrest." As Judge Wright, dissent-
ing in Dorman, suggested, "no reason appears why the judge or commis-
sioner cannot put reasonable limits on its [arrest warrant's) execution,
at least where police state they intend to enter a home to effectuate the
arrest . . . so the time of execution is clearly a consideration that the
judge or commissioner can take into account."7  Limitations can be ap-
plied as well to the place of execution. Alternatively, a search warrant
itself can be issued. Such a suggestion was included by the Baltimore
City Police Commissioner in a General Order issued in response to the
complaints set forth in Lankford v. Gelston:
The question has recently arisen as to the precise scope of the au-
thority conferred upon police officers by arrest warrants ....
A police officer may make a peaceable or a forcible entry to search
any premises for the purpose of arresting a person for whom an arrest
warrant has been issued if, but only if, the officer has probable cause to
believe the accused person to be on the premises to be searched.
.. . If the officer has any doubts as to the existence of "probable
cause," he should immediately seek the issuance of a search warrant, or
consult with the office of the State's Atorney ... before attempting entry
upon private premises in search of the accused person.60
The argument has also been suggested that the inherent mobility of
the person presents grounds for a warrantless search on probable cause.
The reasoning is superficially analogous to that given by the Supreme
Court for warrantless searches of a vehicle upon probable cause "...
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdic-
tion in which the warrant must be sought.""' Even assuming a valid
analogy between automobile searches and person searches, Supreme Court
authority does not "suggest tnat in every conceivable circumstance the
search of an auto even with probable cause may be made without the
extra protection for privacy that a warrant affords." ' As pointed out
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,83 "The word 'automobile' is not a talis-
man in whose presence th6 Fourth Amendment fades away and disap-
pears" 8 ---nor are the words "person" or "arrest."
Furthermore, the automobile-person analogy is faulty because it com-
7 8 See Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
79 Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 402 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
80 364 F.2d 197, 200-01 n.4 (4th Cir. 1966).
81 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
8 2 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50 (1970).
83 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, (1971).
84 Id. at 461-62.
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pares searches of automobiles with searches for persons instead of
searches of automobiles with searches of premises for persons. The dif-
ference is especially important where the premises to be searched is a
person's residence. Decisions of the Supreme Court both before and after
Katz v. United States85 have indicated a continuing preference for the
sanctity of the home as opposed to vehicles. As the Court has said,
"for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional dif-
ference between houses and cars."80
The issue then is whether it is more reasonable to invade the privacy
of a home when the object of a search is inherently mobile than when
the object is inherently immobile. The Supreme Court has not spoken
on this point and the distinction itself is of questionable validity. The
risk that property will be destroyed or removed is conceivably as great
as, if not greater than, the risk that a suspect will flee. Examples of
evidence easily destroyed and evidence easily and secretly removed by
persons other than the suspect are abundant and include drugs, gambling
slips, and paper records such as receipts and memoranda."' When the
problem shifts from property to person, destruction is no longer an issue,
and the risk of the person disappearing by escaping can be reduced by
use of the police stakeout or guard.88
The point is that for exigent circumstances in support of a search
for the person to be reasonable under the Constitution, they should be
reasonable in fact. Fictions, loose analogies, and easy assumptions ought
not be sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement.8"
V. CONCLUSION
The cases discussed establish that searches for the person do occur
in a variety of contexts, and that the problem for the criminal law system
is not frivolous; that current law-whether statutory, administrative or
judicial-does not adequately control the practice; and that whatever ju-
85 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Ka1z, the Court indicated that the
fourth amendment is intended to protect persons not places.
80 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970). Sa also Vale v. Louisiana, 399
U.S. 30 (1970), decided the same day as Chambers.
87 The Supreme Court has never held that the fact that property may be destroyed or
removed, is sufficient by itself to create an exigency. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S, 30,
34-35 (1970).
88 Police guarding of the property was one factor relied upon by the Supreme Court
in refusing to apply the "automobile exception" to the automobile search in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458-62 (1971).
89 As Justice Harlan reminded the Court: "Fidelity to [the warrant principle] reqtires
that, where exceptions are made to accommodate the exigencies of particular situations, those
exceptions be no broader than necessitated by the circumstances presented." Chambers V.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 61 (1970).
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dicial innovation there has been to upgrade the law is too timid. Fortu-
nately, the cases also disclose a willingness on the part of some judges
to consider or reconsider the problem.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire" Justices Stewart and White engaged
in a dialogue which suggests that the Supreme Court may yet examine
the subject." Even as dictum, a statement of the constitutional status of
person searches could be useful in educating police administrators as to
their obligations.92  Beyond dictum, the Court may hold, body exclusion
aside, that the exclusionary rule is applicable to evidence obtained inci-
dent to a constitutional arrest which was made pursuant, however, to
an unconstitutional search for the person. Practically, the little attention
that search for the person has received in both police and judicial annals
may be the result of the absence of a ready judicial remedy for illegal
person searches such as body exclusionf. 3  Whether or not judicial exclu-
sionary controls can be fashioned, alternative remedies and protections"t
should be identified and developed by the legal system. 5
90 403 U.S. 443, 480 (1971).
91 Parts of this dialogue are quoted in note 21, supra.
92The impact of any court decision on relevant publics is unclear. The impact of
dictum is perhaps more so. Nevertheless, for administrators interested in complying with
constitutional requirements, dictum from the Supreme Court can be helpful. See response
of the Baltimore Police Commissioner and the court's reaction to it in Lankford v. Gelston,
364 F.2d 197, 200-05 (4th Cir. 1966).
19 The exclusionary remedy for illegally seized evidence has been the track on which
fourth amendment issues have reached the Supreme Court in abundance. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968). On the other hand, notwithstanding the absence of an
exclusionary rule for illegally seized live bodies, the person search issue has been present
in many cases in which courts considered the admissibility of property found incident to
searches for persons and arrests. Thus the opportunity for judicial clarification of the law
has not been lacking.
94 These should include effective remedies for innocent persons who have been subjected
to warrantless invasions by officers conducting searches for persons under arrest authority.
A recent incident made the front page of the New York Times. On April 23, 1973 four
federal narcotics agents, on the basis of "tips," made forceful warrantless nighttime entries
into the family residences of two Illinois couples-by mistake. N.Y. Times, April 29, 1973
§ 1, at 1, col. 8. According to Myles J. Ambrose, Special Assistant Attorney General,
the agents had been searching for two fugitives. A suit for damages has been filed. N.Y.
Times, May 2, 1973, at 21, col. 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides a remedy for unconsti-
tutional abuses committed by state or local police. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (applicable to federal police). However,
in Rodriguez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1973), a suit for damages under § 1983 was
unsuccessful in the face of a defense that the officers "reasonably [albeit mistakenly) believed
in good faith," Person v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967), that the suspects sought were on
the premises. 473 F.2d at 605. If the standard of reasonableness is the officcr's reason to be-
lieve rather than a prior judicial determination of probable cause (absent any exigent circum-
stances), then even without a search warrant police defenses of reasonableness will prevail
and preclude recovery.
95 Because cases often serve as the initial source of data and because problems often
are first presented to and solved by courts does not mean that courts have prime responsi-
bility for fashioning effective and constitutional police practices. On the contrary, the respon-
sibility is administrative.
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If there is a pivotal feature in distinguishing the reasonableness of
warrantless searches for persons from comparable searches for property
it may be the public interest in apprehending criminals. This interest
demands that the police have effective means for making arrests; how-
ever, given the scope of the exigent circumstances exception to the man-
date of a search warrant, a requirement of prior judicial approval of
searches for persons in the absence of exceptional circumstances would
not appear to impose a major burden upon the police?" Particularly
in this post-Chimel97 period in which searches incident to arrest are nar-
rowly restricted, searches precedent to arrest, unbound by search warrant
requirements and judicial determination of probable cause, become a pos-
sible effective means of undercutting these restrictions and the policies
behind them, and may lead to police use of timed arrests and broad ex-
ploratory searches for persons in order to provide lawful presence and
"inadvertent" discovery of evidence.08 Analysi; reveals, however, no con-
vincing reason why search and seizure procedures do not include search
for the person within their protections."" Absent a search warrant, there
is little to validate a person search on the grounds that arrest or inherent
mobility establishes exigent circumstances.
96We have no empirical evidence one way or the other on this point, If there ate
police reasons why the warrant system would not work, police spokesmen should make
their views known.
97 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Chimel set forth the existing standards
for search incident to a lawful arrest. But cf. United States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467
(1973).
OsSee People v. Bock, 6 Cal. 3d 239, 491 P.2d 9, 98 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1971). After
arresting several persons on the first floor of a home where a pot party was in progress,
the police, incident to the arrest, searched upstairs for additional participants and discovered
marijuana in "plain view." Reversing the trial court's dismissal of the information charg.
ing the defendant with possession of marijuana, the court held the post.arrest search reason-
able and the seizure lawful. Chimel was found to be inapplicable since the officer was
looking for additional suspects and not contraband; but the court questioned the "propriety
of conducting in every case a general exploratory search for 'possible suspects,'" Id, at 243,
491 P.2d at 11, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 659. The dissent pointel out, "To permit such searches
would totally emasculate Chimel and allow the police to search any areas except places like
desk drawers which are so small that even a midget could not hide in one." Id. at 248, 491
P.2d at 15, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 663. See also Guidi v .Superior Court, 14 ClM. L. REP. 2001
(Calif. Sup. Ct. Sept. 5, 1973) and United States v. Blake, 14 CRIM. L RI3P. 2002 (8th Cir.
Sept. 12, 1973).
In United States v. Blair, 366 F. Supp. 1036 (S.D.N.Y. '1973), the district court followed
the rule that "an officer may enter a dwelling to make a warrantless arrest of a person whom
he has probable cause to believe has committed a felony." Id. at 1039. The police entered
an apartment to arrest a suspect. They searched the premises for him but he was not at
home. While searching, however, they found incriminating evidence. They then arrested
three persons who entered the apartment. They found a large quantity of hashish in an
attache case and a satchel carried by one of the arrestees. The hashish was found to be uot
inadmissible on a motion to suppress.
99 This is so unless history is accepted as a convincing reason. The person search histori-
cally was not included within warrant controls over search practices. See the discussion
in Barrett, supra note 2, at 49.
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At the policy level both the history and the current meaning of the
fourth amendment support the constitutional value that police searches-
of all kinds-to be reasonable must be carefully circumscribed. A failure
by courts and the criminal justice system to control and confine police
searches for the person is constitutionally impermissible because it encour-
ages the police to search at a continually more general level, thus creating
the same kind of infringement produced by the hated general warrants
and writs of assistance of pre-constitution days. On balance, the con-
clusion seems clear: the law and the practice concerning person searches
should be made to comply with fourth amendment search warrant re-
quirements. 00
100 That persons, not property, were the objects of the unconstitutional search in Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 2535 (1973), seemed not to be significant to either
the majority or the concurring opinion. The dissents opinion that the search was reasonable
similarly did not turn on the fact that persons qua persons were the search object.
